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1. The Italian election of 2013: the end of bipolarism?
In the decades after the Second World War, electoral competition in Italy 
was constantly organized along the lines of left-right ideological divisions 
(see Bellucci and Segatti 2011). However, the parliamentary election of 2013 
seems to have broken this tradition. The greatest symptom of the left-right 
parties’ failure to provide citizens with guidance for their voting decisions is 
the significant and largely unexpected success of a new political subject that 
has deliberately positioned itself outside of the traditional ideological dialec-
tics: the Five Star Movement (M5s). Founded in 2009 by the comedian Beppe 
Grillo, the M5s is the political derivative of a grassroots movement mainly 
based on the web, which emphasizes in its program issues such as free access 
to the internet and on-line deliberation as an alternative to representative 
democracy (Biorcio and Natale 2013; Corbetta and Gualmini 2013). 
Since its foundation, the M5s has been claiming to be «neither left nor 
right», a position justified by the assumption that the ideological labels are 
just tools employed by the political parties to fool the electorate. In fact, this 
position comes in conjunction with a straightforward accusation that the main 
parties are colluding with each other against the people’s will, which has in-
creasingly strengthened the movement’s reputation as an «anti-politics» party. 
Previous local elections had signaled the growing electoral success of the M5s. 
In March 2010, at the regional elections in Piedmont, the party was accused 
of taking votes away from the left-wing, after the right-wing candidate won 
against the incumbent governor with a margin of 0.4% of the votes. On that 
occasion the M5s obtained 4% of the votes. In 2011 and early 2012 the party 
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ran for other second-order elections, eventually obtaining almost 15% of the 
votes at the regional elections in Sicily. Given these priors, a good perform-
ance of the M5s was widely expected at the national level too. However, the 
25.6% of valid votes for the low chamber obtained by the party at the election 
in February 2013 represented an unprecedented event in Italian republican 
history. It was the first time a party admittedly extraneous to both «left» and 
«right» identifications had obtained such a great electoral success. Thus, it 
is unsurprising that this has been interpreted by many as a collapse of the 
traditional political divisions. 
In light of the impressive breakout of the M5s, pundits have argued 
that Italian politics has moved on from the strong emphasis on left-right 
distinctions that characterized its dialectics during the Second Republic. In 
particular, the elections of 2013 have shown a consistent decline in social-
structural and territorial voting (Diamanti 2013; D’Alimonte and Maggini 
2013; Maggini 2013), two quite common patterns of political behavior among 
Italian citizens (Bellucci and Segatti 2011; Galli and Prandi 1970). Other 
scholars have highlighted an increased tendency among survey respondents 
to refuse to place themselves on a left-right political continuum (Marini 2013; 
for a different view see Segatti 2013). To be sure, in Italian political discourse, 
the ideological labels «left» and «right» are not always employed to refer to 
actual policy or issue-based distinctions. For instance, Diamanti (2009) de-
fined a communicative trait of the former prime minister Silvio Berlusconi as 
«anti-communism without communism», referring to his habit of designating 
as communist everyone who publicly criticizes him or threatens his position, 
such as left-wing politicians, journalists and judges. Yet evidence from po-
litical psychology points out that ideological labels do not actually need to 
have a strong policy content to effectively help citizens in making political 
decisions (Conover and Feldman 1981; Levitin and Miller 1979). Regardless 
of their content, ideological labels have been a prominent heuristic used by 
Italian voters to orientate themselves among different party-blocks during 
the Second Republic. Thus, claiming that they have disappeared, or that they 
have become relatively diluted among other types of considerations, implies 
the assumption that Italian voters have undergone rather important changes 
in their perception of the political space.
All in all, the idea that ideological considerations are losing importance 
is making its way as a brand-new narrative of Italian politics. This is due in 
part to the unprecedented success of a «third party» such as the M5s, and in 
part to a general weakening of the well-established ideologically-based party 
loyalties. Such a narrative implicitly assumes a change in the voters’ minds, 
so that ideological considerations have lost their relevance as a criterion to 
evaluate the political options. However, nothing is known about, first, the 
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causes of this alleged change in people’s minds and, second, whether or not 
the observed electoral turmoil is due to a top-down process instead.
2. The macro-context of the elections
We argue in this study that two characteristics of the macro context in which 
the election of 2013 was held can help explain the electoral change. The first 
and most obvious factor is the deep economic recession that has been affect-
ing Italy since the early months of the global financial crisis in 2008-2009. 
While economic hard times represent a threat to political institutions per 
se (e.g. Newton and Norris 2000), the current global crisis has had, in Italy, 
some additional political implications, mainly due to the escalation of the 
European sovereign debt crisis. The impact of the recession on the Italian 
economy made the country’s debt-to-GDP ratio grow to exceptionally high 
levels as of 2010. In a similar way to other Southern-European countries, such 
as Greece, Spain and Portugal, the high Italian debt increased investors’ fear 
of a sovereign default, leading in turn to further growing bond yields. The 
increasing severity of the situation was reflected by the differential between 
the Italian 10-years benchmark bonds (BTP) and the German Bund, the so-
called «spread», which has grown dramatically since July 2011 and reached 
alarming peaks in November 2011. 
!Figure 1. Unemployment rate (%) and spread PTB/Bund 10y overtime.
Source: Own elaboration of Istat and Thomson-Reuters data.
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The two trends reported in Figure 1 show the escalation of the economic 
and financial crisis in Italy from early 2011 until the elections in late February 
2013. The panel at the top shows the unemployment rate among the whole 
population1. This is a rather standard indicator of economic performance that 
is expected to affect the citizens in a more direct manner compared to others, 
such as e.g. GDP growth. The panel at the bottom shows the spread, i.e. the 
differential between the yield of the Italian 10-year bonds and the German 
Bund multiplied by one-hundred2. The latter indicator is not tied to the actual 
economic performance of the country, but it rather depends on the investors’ 
choices. In this sense, it is to be read as an indicator of the degree of confidence 
that the economic agents have in the capacity of the Italian state to pay back 
its debt, compared to a highly-reliable state (i.e. Germany) as a reference 
point. In spite of its virtual nature, the spread BTP/Bund was the indicator 
on which the media were most-heavily referring to in their narration of the 
crisis in the second half of 20113. The most evident information provided by 
the picture is, on the one hand, the constant growth of unemployment since 
early 2011 until the election, indicating an increasingly poor performance 
of the real economy, and on the other hand, a rather volatile attitude of the 
financial markets towards the Italian debt. In spite of the importance of the 
real economy, the latter indicator became the one responsible for important 
political choices. On November 12, 2011, the government led by the Prime 
Minister Silvio Berlusconi resigned from office, handing the lead to a tech-
nocratic government guided by the economist and former EU commissioner 
Mario Monti. The aim of substituting a government elected by the citizens 
with a government of technocrats was essentially to reassure investors about 
the trustworthiness of Italian politics, and to implement some fairly unpopular 
reforms. However, this was not possible without the support of the parlia-
ment. Thus, Monti’s cabinet came together with a «call for responsibility» 
among all the parties in parliament to support the government’s action, which 
was accepted by all parties but two, the right-wing Northern League and the 
Italy of Values. 
This leads to the second peculiarity of the circumstances in which the 
election of 2013 was held. From November 2011 to the election day in Febru-
1 Data filtered from seasonal effects, obtained from Istat (see <http://www.istat.it/
it/lavoro>).
2  This is a standard way to report this type of indicator. Data obtained from Thomson 
Reuters Datastream (see <https://forms.thomsonreuters.com/datastream/>).
3 A weak indicator of the growing relevance of the spread for the Italian public 
opinion since mid-2011 is the tendency reported by Google Trends, which shows no 
activity before July and a great peak in November. See: <http://www.google.de/trends/ex
plore?q=pread+bund+ptb#q=spread%20bund%20btp&geo=IT&date=1%2F2011%20
27m&cmpt=q>, last accessed 29/09/2013.
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ary 2013, the two main parties in the political system and traditional coalition 
leaders of the ideological blocks, the Democratic Party (Pd) on the left and the 
People of Freedom (Pdl) on the right, were both supporting the government. 
While coalition governments are rather common in Italian politics, a coalition 
between the two main opposing parties was an unprecedented event, especially 
after the attempts to establish a bipolar competition between left and right 
poles after the end of the First Republic in the early 1990s. This created an 
anomalous situation where the two parties, arch-enemies for almost twenty 
years, were standing together supporting the same executive. Moreover, the 
technocratic government implemented a number of highly unpopular reforms, 
such as a particularly tough pension cut and the introduction of a brand new 
property tax. The recognition of the government’s uncomfortable role in do-
ing the «dirty work» on the one hand, and the forced responsibility taking 
due to the exceptional economic crisis on the other, led the two parties to 
establish a rather ambivalent interaction, which consisted of frequent recipro-
cal public attacks on one another and of general cooperative behavior in the 
legislative context. All in all, for about fourteen months, the two principal 
alternatives on the Italian political landscape were sharing the responsibility 
and supporting an unpopular government in times of economic crisis. This 
fact, in spite of more or less explicit attempts to distance themselves from the 
government, may have been perceived by the electorate, and affected their 
political behavior.
3. Two mechanisms to explain the crisis of ideology
We propose two mechanisms by which the political context may have reduced 
the importance of ideology distinctions, and particularly of the single left-right 
dimension, in the eyes of the voters4. The first refers to the effect of the joint 
support of the government by both the Pd and the Pdl on voters’ perceptions 
of ideological differences. As Fortunato and Stevenson (2013) show, coalition 
partners are perceived by the general public as more ideologically similar than 
they actually are. In the same way, the coalition between the Pd and the Pdl 
may have led citizens to perceive them as ideologically close to each other. 
As the two parties have traditionally been the coalition leaders of the two 
ideological blocks, a perceived convergence between them could have led 
citizens to discount ideological considerations as criteria to discern between 
the possible alternatives at the time of the election. Such a mechanism is es-
4 We use left-right as synonymous of ideology since in Western Europe left-right is 
usually considered as the most important dimension of the broader concept of ideology 
(Benoit and Laver 2006; Inglehart and Klingemann 1976). 
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sentially the inverse of the salience effect of party polarization on issue and 
ideological considerations that is well established in political science literature 
(Alvarez and Nagler 2004; Dalton 2008; Kroh 2009; Lachat 2008, 2011; van 
der Eijk et al. 2005). 
A second mechanism relates to the negative economic conditions in 
which elections were held. Literature on economic voting has long since 
established the reward-punish hypothesis: voters tend to punish the govern-
ment when economic conditions are bad (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007; 
Duch and Stevenson 2008). Given the bipolar competition that characterized 
Italian politics in the Second Republic, Italian voters in 2013 are generally 
used to a pattern of alternation between ideologically-homogeneous left and 
right wing governments. Thus, until the Monti government, both ideological 
and economic considerations would put one block against the other. This im-
plied that, during economic hard times, whoever was in opposition could use 
ideological arguments to blame the government for its negative performance, 
and whoever was in government could use ideological arguments to argue 
that the opposition would have done worse. However, in 2013 Italian voters 
were confronted for the first time with a scenario where flaunted ideological 
differences were in fact contradicted by an actual shared (negative) perform-
ance in office. For this reason, the bad economic performance registered in 
Italy in the months before the election could have given Italian voters a «cold 
shower», waking them up from the widely-used narrative of the ideological 
conflict and showing them that, in fact, both ideological sides are equally 
defenseless in front of the economic crisis.
Both mechanisms lead to the same prediction: a reduced importance of 
ideology in guiding Italian voters’ party evaluations. This is in a way different 
from what pundits have been claiming since just after the election in Febru-
ary, namely that ideology would no longer be a source of political identity for 
the Italian public. Rather, what we contend here is that the Italian election 
of 2013 has been characterized by the fact that for many voters, ideological 
considerations became more fallible in helping them distinguish between 
the two most important Italian parties. This could have helped parties that 
have been able to distinguish themselves from the status quo by stating their 
extraneousness from ideological diatribes, such as the M5s. Moreover, this 
could have weakened some other well-established linkages between parties 
and voters, such as those based on left-right considerations. In the following 
sections of this paper we focus on the latter type of indicator, i.e. the role 
of ideology in influencing people’s party preferences. A general theoretical 
framework to account for this is presented in the next section.
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4. Ideology, economy, and the process of voting decision
When studying the process of voting decision, the concept of «party utility» 
becomes very useful. The origin of this concept goes back to Downs’ (1957) 
economic account of vote choice, which in turn builds on preference models 
developed in microeconomics. In this framework, utility can be defined as 
the degree of expected satisfaction that an individual attaches to the different 
options that he/she can choose from, and this determines the outcome of the 
choice itself5. In literature on voting behavior, sources of utility are usually 
attributed to policy-related considerations (e.g. Downs 1957; Stokes 1963), 
evaluations of the past performance of the elites in government (Fiorina 
1981), attachments to partisan groups (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960) and voters’ 
social-structural characteristics (e.g. Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Lipset and Rokkan 
1967). All in all, the vote has been conceptualized in this framework as the 
outcome of a complex process where different considerations enter into play 
at different steps, converging towards the final choice. This conceptualization 
is better known as the «funnel of causality» (Campbell et al. 1960), as it views 
the act of voting as the endpoint of a series of causal determinants, in which 
some factors are closer both temporally and causally to the decision to vote, 
while others are more distant. 
Long-term determinants of voting behavior include social cleavages 
and political predispositions. While the former refer to the social structural 
characteristics of people, the latter are understood as factors that find their 
main sources in parties and politics such as party identifications and ideo-
logical self-categorizations. On the opposite end of the funnel, short-term 
determinants include evaluations of candidates during the electoral campaign, 
opinions on issues that are salient in the political debate at the moment of 
the election, and, most important for our study, considerations regarding the 
economic performance of the government. The state of the economy is likely to 
affect citizens’ opinions in a rather direct manner, as when jobs are lacking or 
prices are rising people will tend to blame the government. In fact, it is widely 
agreed that when the economic conditions of a country are not satisfactory, 
the incumbent government will be punished by the voters (Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmaier 2000, 2007; see Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck 2013 for a discussion 
of policy versus valence-oriented economic voting). All these considerations 
are expected to influence party utilities, which are in turn assumed to be deter-
ministically linked to the act of voting (van der Eijk et al. 2006). In other words, 
utility evaluations for specific parties are expected to incorporate a mixture 
5 For a discussion about the link between utility and choice in voting behavior, see 
Adams et al. (2005), ch. 3.
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of both the manifestation of citizens’ long-term political predispositions and 
their short-term evaluations (see also Tillie 1999; van der Brug et al. 2007). 
In Italy, after the end of the Second World War and during the whole of 
the First Republic, voting choices were mainly a function of long-term cleav-
ages such as religious attendance and social class. This changed during the 
Second Republic, as the explanatory contribution of social structure on vote 
choice declined significantly. As a consequence political predispositions, and 
in particular left-right self-perceptions, as well as economic considerations, 
have become a far more important predictor of party preferences than in the 
past (Sani and Segatti 2002; Bellucci 2012). We hypothesize here that the 
short-term considerations may have moderated the impact of the long-term 
predispositions due to the exceptional nature of the economic crisis and of the 
presence of the technocratic government supported in parliament by the main 
parties. More specifically, as we detailed in the previous section, we argue that 
the economic crisis, together with the unusual left-right coalition supporting 
the technocratic government, have led to a shrinkage in the perceived differ-
ences of the party coalition leaders of the two ideological blocks (Pd and Pdl). 
This, in turn, may have resulted in decreased importance given to ideological 
self-placement in influencing the utility attributed to these parties. 
In the framework of the funnel of causality, the focus of our study can be 
graphically displayed as follows (see Figure 2). Our central question is whether 
or not this peculiar economic-political context affected the direction and/or 
strength of the relationship between left-right self-placement and party utility.
SES Vote ChoiceLeft/Right
Self-Placemente
Party Utility
Economic Crisis/
Technocratic Government
Figure 2. Funnel of Causality and the Moderating Effect of the Macro Context
Source: Own elaboration.
In short, we expect that, after Silvio Berlusconi resigned from office 
and a technocratic government supported in parliament by both Pd and Pdl 
replaced his right-wing government, ideology substantially reduced its impact 
in explaining the utility of both parties. This is mainly due to the fact that 
citizens who situated themselves as ideologically closer to either the left or the 
right needed to deal cognitively with the fact that a) the state of the economy 
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was poor and b) the main party representing their ideological stance was sup-
porting a technocratic government that was implementing some unpopular 
reforms in the deep of the economic crisis.
5. Data, Variables, and Methods
We investigate the mechanisms discussed in the previous sections by relying 
on public opinion data collected from March 2011 to the election month in 
February 2013, i.e. from four months prior the moment when the «spread 
crisis» started capturing the attention of the media, and eight months prior 
the resignation of Silvio Berlusconi as Prime Minister and the subsequent 
handover of power to Mario Monti6. The time scope of our observation allows 
us to assess the importance of ideological considerations for Italians’ party 
evaluations since before the most dramatic developments in the economic 
situation, and their political consequences, took place. In other words, our 
design emphasizes the time variation of some contextual characteristics, i.e. 
the presence of the technocratic government and the actual fluctuations of 
macro-economic indicators, and their impact on individual considerations, 
relying on a demographically-homogeneous sample of Italian citizens. Our 
individual-level data comes from a repeated cross-sectional survey conducted 
by Ipsos7. Interviews have been conducted following the Computer Assisted 
Telephone Interviewing (Cati) method, on a sample drawn via random digit 
dialing within strata defined by geopolitical area, size of municipality, gender 
and age. Each month a large number of citizens were contacted and asked the 
same questions, for a total of 94,224 cases over 21 months (with a sample size 
spanning from 2,715 respondents in July 2011 to 9,634 in November 2011). 
Given our interest in assessing the role of ideology in the evaluations of 
the two major Italian parties, we focus on the association between left-right 
self-perceptions and the «propensity to vote» (Ptv) scores that respondents 
have for the People of Freedom (Pdl) and the Democratic Party (Pd). The Ptv 
scores are an effective way to measure nuances in party preferences without 
binding the respondents’ assessment to an ipsative (or «forced choice») meas-
ure such as the vote choice (van der Eijk et al. 2006). While random utility 
models are often tested on discrete choice data by relying on techniques such as 
conditional or multinomial logistic models, scholars of political behavior have 
proposed over time several measures to directly observe party preferences. 
6 From the monthly time series three months are missing, i.e. August 2011, January 
2012 and August 2012.
7 Ipsos is a social research institute that collects citizens’ public opinion. Data have 
been bought by the University of Milan thanks to a grant of the Fondazione Cariplo.
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Among these, the most common are the «feeling thermometers» widely used 
by the American National Election Studies (Anes), the «like-dislike» scales 
used in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (Cses) project, and the 
«Ptv» scores used, among others, by the European Election Studies (Ees). 
Although these variables might seem to measure the same construct, it has 
been shown that Ptv scores are better related to the actual vote choice (van 
der Eijk and Marsh 2007). Thus, given our interest in observing voting utili-
ties, these variables can be regarded as a more direct measure of party evalu-
ations than party choice (see also Tillie 1995). In our data Ptvs are measured 
in a fairly standard way, i.e. by asking the respondents to indicate how likely 
they will ever vote in the future for each of the two parties. The variables are 
measured on a scale going from 1 (low) to 10 (high) that has been rescaled 
from 0 (low) to 1 (high) for our analyses.
The covariate of interest for our study is people’s ideological self-posi-
tioning. Given the centrality of the labels «left» and «right» in the political 
discourse during the Second Republic, we expect respondents’ self-placement 
among these categories to be strongly associated with the Ptvs for both the 
Pdl and the Pd. We observe this construct by asking respondents to place 
themselves on a Likert-type scale going from 1 (left) to 7 (right), with an extra 
option for those who refuse to place themselves. For our models we center 
the 7-point scale on the value 4, so that 0 becomes the center, positive values 
reflect right-wing positions and negative values left-wing positions. Given 
the direction of the scale from left to right, we expect a positive association 
of the variable with the Ptv of the Pdl, and a negative association with the 
Ptv of the Pd. Respondents refusing to place themselves have been included 
in the 0 category. This choice has a substantive and a practical motivation. 
Substantively, studies indicate that people who do not place themselves on 
the ideology scale and those who position themselves in the middle share 
similar characteristics (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, 247; Vassallo 2006). 
Practically, as we will see later, including the «non-positioned» allows us to 
keep in the sample about 20% of respondents each month, who would have 
otherwise been excluded from the analyses. However, to control for potential 
heterogeneity we include in the model a dummy variable to identify those 
cases (1 = refuses to position him/herself; 0 = everybody else)8.
According to our theoretical expectations, the correlation between left-
right self-placement and the PTVs of the two parties is moderated by two 
potential modifiers, i.e. Monti’s government and the state of the economy. 
More bluntly, we expect that both the presence of a technocratic govern-
ment and the worsening of the economic conditions to reduce the magnitude 
8 All the models have been run also excluding those cases from the analysis (i.e. 
coding them as missing), leading to no substantial change in the results.
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of the association between ideology and party preferences9. Thus, we code 
the first variable as a dummy indicating when the technocratic cabinet was in 
place (code 1 = from November 2011 to February 2013) as opposed to when 
the Pdl-led government was still ruling (code 0 = from March 2011 until 
October 2011). To observe the variation of economic conditions, we choose 
to focus on the monthly average unemployment rate. This measure has some 
advantages compared to other economic indicators. First, it offers a picture 
of the economic situation of the country which is as clean as possible from 
the effects of short-term political changes. This property does not apply to 
other indicators that are tied to the trust of the financial markets and therefore 
strongly endogenous to political events, such as the «spread» between the 
Italian 10-years benchmark bonds (BTP) and the German Bund10. Second, a 
growing unemployment rate is a symptom of the recession that should affect 
citizens more directly than general measures of wealth, such as the GDP per 
capita. Finally, by using «objective» economic indicators instead of socio-
tropic or ego-tropic evaluations of the economy, we overcome endogeneity 
problems and ensure better comparability across time.
Control variables included in all models are age, measured in years and 
centered on the sample mean; gender, a dummy variable coded 0 for males 
and 1 for females; five standard geo-political areas, which historically vary on 
their political preferences, as a categorical variable: North-West (the refer-
ence category, including the regions of Piedmont, Aosta Valley, Lombardy, 
and Liguria), North-East (the so called «white area», including Trentino-Alto 
Adige/South Tyrol, Veneto and Friuli-Venezia Giulia), Center-North (the so 
called «red belt area», including Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria and the 
Marches), Center-South (Lazio, Abruzzo, Molise and Sardinia), and the South 
(Campania, Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily). Education is an ordinal variable 
with five ascending categories: no education titles, primary school diploma, 
middle school diploma, 2-3 years professional diploma, 5-years high school 
diploma, university degree. Finally, frequency of attendance to religious service 
is used as an ordinal variable in four ascending categories: never/almost never, 
9 Ideally, we would also model the interaction between the two, as the effect of the 
economy should change depending on the incumbency status of a party, which would vary 
only for the Pdl with the start of the technocratic government. Unfortunately the number 
of time points that we have before November 2011 is too small to grant us enough level-2 
degrees of freedom to model properly the effect of economy before and after such a th-
reshold. A plausible effect that we would expect to find, but we cannot measure here, is 
a greater tendency to punish the Pdl before Monti’s government, and therefore a strong 
negative main effect of unemployment on the Ptv for the Pdl.
10 Previous versions of the paper reported additional analyses relying on alternative 
specifications using the spread as level-2 variable. These analyses led to very similar results 
to those reported here.
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a few times per year, 1-2 times per month, weekly. Both education and church 
attendance have been centered on their median. 
Given the hierarchical structure of our data, the analyses are conducted 
using a multilevel linear regression technique, with individual respondents 
nested within months. Next to the «standard» regression coefficients, that are 
interpreted in the multilevel setting as «fixed effects» (i.e. their magnitude is 
constant among all time points), this method allows us to estimate a difference 
intercept for each month, and, possibly, set the magnitude of some individual-
level predictors free to vary across months. Both these parameters, i.e. the 
varying intercepts and the varying slopes, are called «random effects», as they 
are estimated so that they take a different value for each month. In our case, 
besides the random intercept, we specify the model with a random slope for 
left-right self-placement. Thus, our model will estimate a different intercept 
(i.e. the average Ptv for the two parties when all predictors are at zero) and a 
different value of the coefficient of left-right position on the two Ptvs for each 
month. This first step will allow us to describe how the correlation between 
ideology and party preferences changes over the time span covered by our 
data. Then, in a second step, this correlation will be interacted with our two 
contextual variables, namely the technocratic government’s dummy and the 
unemployment rate. This will tell us how much the association between left-
right self-positioning and the preferences for Pd and Pdl varies (1) before and 
after the beginning of Monti’s government, and (2) across levels of unemploy-
ment. Thus, to sum up, the estimated models will be three for each party’s 
Ptv: one with all the individual-level and context-level predictors, with the 
random coefficient for left-right self-placement (the «base model») and other 
two for the two relevant interactions, i.e. one between left-right position and 
our technocratic government dummy and another between left-right position 
and the unemployment rate11. Results are discussed in the next section.
6. Results
The first piece of evidence that can inform our discussion regarding the allege-
dly declining importance of ideology for Italian voters comes from observing 
people’s will to place themselves on the left-right. In fact, the claim that ide-
11 We choose to estimate two separate models for the two interactions to avoid to 
incur into excessive collinearity between the two interacted variables. In fact, when the 
two interactions are computed their correlation is rather high (Pearson’s r = 0.895). Thus, 
the inclusion of both may lead to unreliable estimates for one of the two interactions. 
Models are estimated via Restricted Maximum Likelihood (REML) using the package 
«lme4» of the software R.
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ology has lost importance can imply different things, including that citizens 
consider the ideological labels less appropriate for defining their own political 
identities. Thus, to find an increasing tendency over time among respondents 
to refuse to position themselves on the left-right would constitute a symptom 
that the importance of ideological self-identities has diminished during the 
observed period of time.
!
Figure 3. Percentage of respondent who refuse to position themselves on the left-
right scale each month.
Source: Own elaboration of IPSOS.
Figure 3 shows the percentage of refusals in every month of our study. 
In spite of some fluctuations, mainly due to the differences between samples, 
the trend is stationary over time. In other words, our data show that from 
March 2011 to February 2013 there have been no systematic changes in the 
tendency of Italian voters to ideologically define themselves as left or right. 
This finding, consistent with what observed also by other studies (see Itanes 
2013, Segatti 2013) suggests a first important implication: if ideology has 
become less important at all, the phenomenon relates to how citizens use it 
to evaluate parties, not to how they define themselves. Thus, the change must 
have occurred in the link between ideology and party preferences, not in the 
centrality of the former as a representation of the political space.
To observe whether this is the case, Table 1 shows the result of the three 
models discussed in the previous section, estimated for both Pd and Pdl. 
The table reports all the «fixed effects» (i.e. the coefficients associated to the 
independent variables) and the variance of the «random effects» (i.e. the dif-
ferent intercepts and slopes of left-right position estimated for each month). 
As a general rule, the models referred to with to the letter «a» predict the 
Ptv for the Pd, and those with the letter «b» predict the Ptv for the Pdl. The 
estimation and model specification are identical for both parties. 
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Table 1. Models for propensity to vote for PD & PDL (Standard errors in paren-
theses). 
Dependent variable:
PTV PD PTV PDL
(1a) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2b) (3b)
Age 0.001*** 0.001***  0.001*** 0.0003***  0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Gender (Female) 0.015*** 0.015***  0.015***  0.006** 0.006**  0.006** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Education -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  -0.013***  -0.013***  -0.013*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Church Attendance  0.006***  0.006***  0.006***  0.016***   0.016***  0.016*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
North-East 0.002 0.002 0.002  -0.017***  -0.017***  -0.017*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Center-North 0.015***  0.015***  0.015***  -0.010**   -0.010**  -0.010** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Center-South 0.001 0.001 0.001  0.012***   0.012***  0.012*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
South  0.010**  0.010**  0.010**  0.015***   0.015***  0.015*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Left-Right Position -0.112*** -0.118*** -0.139***  0.123***   0.140***  0.226*** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.019) (0.004) (0.005) (0.021)
Not Positioned on L-R -0.173*** -0.173*** -0.173***  -0.129***  -0.129***  -0.129*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Monti Government -0.026  -0.036* -0.026 0.004 -0.016 0.005
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
Unemployment Rate 0.010 0.009 0.006 -0.015***  -0.015***  -0.024*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
L-R Position
*Monti Government 
0.009
(0.005)
 -0.026*** 
(0.007)
L-R Position
*Unemployment Rate 
0.003
(0.002)
-0.010*** 
(0.002)
Intercept  0.316***  0.325***  0.350***  0.427*** 0.443*** 0.513*** 
(0.047) (0.048) (0.053) (0.032) (0.032) (0.036)
Var Intercept 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002
Var L-R Position 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001
Var Residual 0.0811 0.0811 0.0811 0.0653 0.0653 0.0653
Observations          48930 48930 48930 48998 48998 48998
Groups (Months) 21 21 21 21 21 21
Log Likelihood         -8057 -8060 -8062 -2787 -2786 -2784
Akaike Inf. Crit.       16149 16156 16159 5609 5607 5605
Bayesian Inf. Crit.  16298 16315 16318 5758 5766 5763
Note: *p <0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Source: Own elaboration of IPSOS – Istat data.
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Models 1a and 1b include all the predictors except the interactions. 
As expected, given the direction of the variable, the coefficient of left-right 
self-placement is negative for the Pd and positive for the Pdl. More in de-
tail, moving one step on the right is reflected in a reduction of about 0.112 
points (on the 0-1 scale) in propensity to vote for the Pd, and an increase of 
0.123 points in the propensity to vote for the Pdl. These values refer to the 
average association between left-right self-placement and the Ptvs across the 
time periods. However, given the random slope specification, it is possible to 
observe how the association between left-right and the Ptvs varies along our 
time period. This is done in Figure 4.
The points in the picture represent the coefficients of left-right posi-
tion for each month in our time period. The 95% confidence intervals are 
computed based on the standard errors associated for each random effect, as 
returned by the model. The horizontal black lines correspond to the average 
coefficients, or «fixed effects», i.e. the same values reported in Table 1. The 
y-axes of the two plots are set to the same magnitude, so that the two panels 
are immediately comparable. This shows that, in the time period considered, 
the association between ideology and Ptv varies much more for the Pdl (with 
a range of about 0.06 points) than for the Pd (with a range of about 0.035 
points). Substantively, this may indicate that the role of ideology is more stable 
for the evaluation of the Pd than of the Pdl. 
The vertical dotted lines represent some relevant events happened dur-
ing the time period that may have had an impact on the association between 
ideology and party preferences. November 2011 (1) is when PM Berlusconi 
resigned and Monti government supported by a Pd-Pdl coalition started. As 
the picture clearly shows, from that point in time the association between ideol-
ogy and Ptv becomes significantly weaker for both the Pdl and the Pd. How-
ever, from mid-September 2012 (2), it starts becoming increasingly stronger 
for both parties, with a significant leap between September and October for 
the Pd. This is the effective start of the campaign for the primary elections 
of the left-wing coalition, when the most of the competitors presented their 
candidacy. The primaries seem to have in part «closed the ranks» of left-wing 
voters, increasing the connection between their ideological self-identification 
and their evaluation of the Pd. Since the fall of 2012 the magnitude of the 
coefficients grows in a fairly constant fashion until the elections in February 
2013 (5). Two other relevant events happened in November and December 
2012, although they do not seem to exert particular shocks on the trend. These 
are the regional elections in Sicily (3), with the first breakout success of the 
M5s, and the anticipated withdraw of the Pdl support from Monti government 
(4). While the latter event essentially marked the beginning of the electoral 
campaign, the increase in importance of ideology on the vote for both parties 
seems to start rather with the primaries of the Pd.
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Figure 4. Random Effects of Ideology on Ptvs over Time. 
Source: Own elaboration of IPSOS and Istat data.
Models 2a and 2b in Table 1 show the moderating impact of the left-
right support for the Monti government on the association between ideology 
and party evaluations. For both parties, the sign of the interaction (positive 
for Pd and negative for Pdl) is opposite to the sign of the main effect of ideol-
ogy (negative for Pd and positive for Pdl), indicating a reduced association 
during the grand coalition’s endorsement of the technocratic government. 
This confirms in part what shown in Figure 4. On the other hand, the effect 
is significant and substantial only for the Pdl, while almost non existent for 
the Pd. The marginal effects of ideology for the two values of the dummy are 
plotted in Figure 5. 
As the figure shows, the bipartisan support for Monti government exerts 
a small but significant moderation on the association between ideology and 
the propensity to vote for the Pdl. On average, the coefficient is reduced by 
almost 0.03 points (on the 0-1 scale) during the technocratic government 
in respect to the months before. The figure also shows that there is no real 
impact concerning the Pd. All in all, our first expectation is only in part cor-
roborated by the data: being a coalition partner with the major exponent of 
the rival ideological block in supporting the technocratic government reduced 
the magnitude of ideological considerations for the evaluation of the Pdl, but 
not for the evaluation of the Pd.
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Figure 5. Marginal Effects of Ideology (left-right) in interaction with Technocratic 
Government on Ptvs.
Source: Own elaboration of IPSOS and Istat data. 
The coefficients in models 3a and 3b tell a similar story. Concerning the 
Pdl, the interaction effect is negative and significant. Thus, the worse the eco-
nomic conditions, as reflected by a higher unemployment rate, the weaker the 
association between ideology and the Ptv of the center-right party. Conversely, 
the interaction effect is essentially null for the Pd, indicating that the influence 
of ideological considerations among Italian voters as they evaluated the Pd 
were not influenced by its support of Monti’s cabinet in the months before 
the 2013 election. The two marginal effects are plotted in Figure 6. The plots 
represent how moving one step to the right is associated to a variation of the 
Ptv for the two parties, as unemployment rate goes from the minimum (about 
7.75%) to the maximum (about 11.66%) of the time period observed. As the 
figure shows, as the unemployment rate increases of about four percentage 
points, the association between ideology and the propensity to vote for the 
Pdl drops of about 0.04 points (on the 0-1 scale). Once more, the effect is 
absent for the Pd, for which the plot shows essentially a straight line. Thus, if 
the importance of ideological considerations in guiding Italians’ vote in 2013 
has been reduced at all, this happened only for their evaluations of the Pdl.
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Figure 6. Marginal Effects of Ideology (left-right) in interaction with Unemploy-
ment Rate on Ptvs.
Source: Own elaboration of IPSOS and Istat data. 
7. Conclusions 
The premise of this study was that the Italian parliamentary elections of Fe-
bruary 2013 have been held in a context in which there was a dramatic lack 
of orientation for public opinion. The failure of the major parties to provide 
citizens with guidance for their voting decisions resulted in the unexpected 
success of a new political subject, the Five Star Movement, which seems to have 
led to the end of the Pdl-Pd bipolarism of Italian politics. This was interpreted 
by pundits and media as a sign of the fact that ideological considerations are 
no longer important at all for the voters. In this study we propose and test two 
mechanisms by which ideological considerations could have lost their guiding 
role among Italian voters’ political considerations. We start by discussing 
two factors of the macro context that have particularly characterized these 
elections. One is the economic recession that has been affecting Italy since the 
start of the global crisis in 2008-2009. Another is the political crisis, largely 
determined by the economic one, which led to a technocratic government 
supported in parliament by all the most important parties, including the 
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main right-wing and left-wing coalition leaders, i.e. the Pdl and the Pd. We 
hypothesize two mechanisms by which the macro context could have had a 
negative influence on the ability of ideology to predict the vote choice. The 
first draws on the impact of coalition participation on citizens’ perception of 
ideological similarity between parties (Fortunato and Stevenson 2013), and 
argues that an increased perceived similarity may have convinced voters that 
left-right considerations are no longer relevant for discerning among parties. 
The second builds on the reward-punishment hypothesis, which expects 
that voters tend to punish incumbents when economic conditions are bad 
(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007). Given the deep economic crisis that has 
characterized the recent Italian context, and the fact that both the Pdl and 
the Pd were supporting the technocratic government in parliament, we argue 
that this decision, and the way it was enacted by the two major parties over the 
period, may have reduced the perceived scope of ideological differences.
We investigated such hypotheses using a repeated cross-sectional study 
monitoring public opinion since March 2011 to February 2013. By employing 
multilevel regression analysis, with individuals nested within months, tested 
the moderating effect that the presence of the technocratic government 
and the looming economic crisis had on the relationship between left-right 
self-placement and the propensity to vote (Ptv) for the coalitions leaders of 
the two rival ideological blocks: Pd and Pdl. Our results only partially sup-
port our expectations. First, we find that (1) the proportion of people that 
refuse to place themselves on the left-right scale has remained constant over 
the time period considered and (2) ideology is still a strong predictor of the 
propensity to vote for the Pd and the Pdl. Second, we find mixed results for 
the moderating effects of the macro context. Our data show that the joint 
support for the technocratic government significantly reduced the association 
between ideology and the Ptv of the right-wing Pdl, but not of the left-ring 
Pd. The same result emerges when the moderating impact of the worsening 
of the economic crisis, measured by observing the unemployment rate, is 
considered. While higher unemployment means a weaker correlation between 
left-right self-placement and the the propensity to vote for the Pdl, no such 
effect is observed for the Pd. 
The fact that our expectations hold for the evaluations of Pdl but not 
for the Pd is rather counterintuitive if this result is seen through the glasses of 
two general theories such as the perceived ideological similarity of coalition 
partners (Fortunato and Stevenson 2013) and the economic voting (Lewis-
Beck and Stegmaier 2007). However, when a more detailed perspective on the 
Italian political landscape is taken, our results are not necessarily incompat-
ible with the theoretical expectations discussed earlier in the article. In this 
respect we suggest two possible explanations. The first relates to the use of 
the left-right rhetoric in the current Italian political debate. As mentioned in 
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the first section, the emphasis on the ideological («left» and «right») labels 
is a rather central component of the political rhetorics of the former prime 
minister and guide of the Pdl Silvio Berlusconi since his entrance in politics 
in 1994 (Diamanti 2009). In fact, the political «right» identity (usually as-
sociated with the prefix «center-» to convey moderation) became popular in 
Italy only after his appearance in the Second Republic with the party «Forza 
Italia», which later merged into the Pdl. On the contrary, the «left» identity 
may be much more stable, as it was widely employed since long before the 
appearance of the Pd, whose roots can be broadly traced back to the major 
left-wing party in the First Republic (the Pci , i.e. the Italian Communist Party). 
The relatively younger age of the «right-wing» self-identity may have led to a 
greater volatility of its relevance in the recognition and the evaluation of the 
Pdl (as suggested by the larger variance of the random slopes, if compared 
to the Pd, as observed in Figure 4) and in general to a greater sensitivity to 
other short-term factors such as economic evaluations. Given the scope of 
our data, this explanation should be regarded here as a simple speculation. 
However, a potentially fruitful field where future research could focus regards 
the nature of the ideological identities in the Italian electorate, i.e. their social 
and psychological bases, as well as the role played by the political actors in 
shaping them over time.
A second explanation relates to the blame for the crisis attributed by 
citizens on the left and the right of the political spectrum. More specifically we 
argue that, when the political situation prior the technocratic government is 
taken into account, our results are fairly congruent with the economic voting 
theory. On the left side, the bipartisan coalition supporting the technocratic 
government might have been rationalized as the «bitter medicine» to take for 
the «good of the country», as a consequence of the economic damage caused 
by the opponent’s government. In this sense, even during the rule of the tech-
nocratic government, the blame for the negative economic performance was 
directed mainly towards the previous right-wing government led by the Pdl, 
as the main effect of unemployment observed in Table 1 suggests. This could 
be somewhat corroborated by the fact that this interpretation was, more or 
less, implicitly recognized by other European countries and also, at least at 
the beginning of Monti’s government, by the main referent newspaper for the 
center-left La Repubblica. Conversely, on the right side, the economic crisis 
and the subsequent technocratic government may have had a much larger 
impact. In this sense, the widely agreed-upon blame of the former govern-
ment for a poor management of the economic crisis may have translated into 
a major disappointment of right-wing voters, or at least of part of them, who 
recognized and accepted the negative performance of «their own» government 
as the main reason for the current state of affairs. This may have led them to 
defect not much from the Pdl itself (i.e. from admitting a propensity to vote 
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for it) but rather from the narrative, largely promoted by its leader, positing 
that ideological identities intrinsically carry the recipe for a good govern-
ance. In other words, the strength of the argument according to which the 
importance of ideological considerations for party preferences was moderated 
by the technocratic government and by the economic crisis is to be assessed 
considering the rather short life of Monti’s government itself (to explain the 
relatively small magnitude of the effects observed in our data) and the fact 
that voters probably kept memory of who was the incumbent until November 
2011 (to explain the presence of significant effects for the Pdl only)12.
These are only speculations that need to be tested in further studies, 
where other factors will need to be taken into account. The current study 
represents just a first step in the direction of a better understanding of the 
role that ideological orientations played in the parliamentary elections of 
February 2013. Yet, the picture to be drawn is much more complex than what 
discussed here. First, other events may have impacted on citizens’ evaluations 
of the Pdl and the Pd, such as for instance the costs reimbursement scandal 
in the Lazio Region that involved the Pdl coordinator Franco Fiorito, or the 
great losses of one of the major Italian banks, Monte dei Paschi di Siena, and 
fraud investigations addressed to the Pd. Second, in addition to studying the 
evaluations of the two main coalition leaders, a more accurate explanation 
should take into account the active role played by other political parties, 
most notably the M5s. Indeed, the relevant question to be investigated by 
further research are the reasons of the 25% of the voters who chose a new 
party that deliberately placed itself outside of the traditional left-right scale, 
while the effect of left-right ideology remained stable and significant for the 
two coalition-leader parties. Was this result due to an occasional deviation 
from the «normal» vote that affected only these elections? Or are the electoral 
results indicating that there has been a dealignment among the electorate (i.e. 
a process whereby a large portion of the electorate abandons its previous af-
filiation, without developing a new one to replace it, see Dalton et al. 1984)? 
Most likely, the current Italian scenario is in between these two extremes. In 
this respect, what we can think at this stage to be a crucial element that needs 
to be accounted for in future studies is the impact of anti-politics orientations 
on the vote choice, a feeling that has been successfully utilized in the electoral 
campaign by the leader of the M5s, Beppe Grillo. All in all, the puzzle raised 
by this study and the indications for future studies point out that still much 
needs to be done in order to understand what role these elections had in the 
cycle of the Second Republic. What we show here is that left-right considera-
tions are still a relevant factor among citizens’ vote choice, a factor that new 
12 We are grateful to two of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting this reading.
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actors will need to confront themselves with if they want to consolidate their 
role in the ever-changing Italian political scenery.
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